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Abstract
In this paper, we axiomatically characterize the universality and eciency of price mechanism based
on an expansion possibility of economic environments like trading opportunities, immigrants, agents'
consumption sets through the cultural globalization, and so on. Together with some generalized
settings like economy dependent message-response structure, we base our argument on the framework
of Sonnenschein (1974). In Sonnenschein (1974), the price mechanism is characterized in more specic
way than that of Hurwicz (1960), Mount and Reiter (1974), etc. for the informational eciency
problem. His model, however, has an advantage to describe the universality and eciency of the price
mechanism from the category-theoretic viewpoint through the basic economic tool of the excess demand
function. His approach also enables us to characterize the price mechanism through cooperative game
theoretic settings like the core quivalence that is closely related to the replica stability axiom of social
choice settings like Thomson (1988) and Nagahisa (1994).
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1 Introduction
An axiomatic characterization of the price mechanism as an ecient allocation mechanism provides
one of the most important progresses in the general equilibrium theory (see, e.g., Hurwicz 1960, Mount
and Reiter 1974, Sonnenschein 1974, Osana 1978, Jordan 1982, etc.). Such arguments are concerned
with problems on the desirability of the price mechanism, which gives a path-breaking framework for the
development in the 1970s and 80s of the eld called the mechanism design.
In this paper, we base our argument on the framework of Sonnenschein (1974), and axiomatically
characterize the universality and eciency of price mechanism from the category-theoretic viewpoint
together with an expansion possibility of economies. Our arguments include the problems concerning not
only the simple expansion of trading opportunities, expansion of members like immigrants, the increase
of women's labor force and so forth, but also expansions of agents' consumption sets caused by cultural
enlightenments and/or globalization.
Although the message mechanism of Sonnenschein (1974) is characterized in more specic way than
that of Hurwicz (1960) or Mount and Reiter (1974), his approach has advantages such that (i) it describes
the category-theoretic universality and eciency of the price mechanism through the elementary economic
tool of the excess demand function, (ii) it allows for the message-response structure partially depending on
the economies, and (iii) it enables us to characterize the price mechanism by cooperative game theoretic
setting of the core equivalence that is closely related to the replica stability axiom of social choice settings
like Thomson (1988) and Nagahisa (1994).
It has generally been said that the market or price mechanism has a close relation to the progress of
globalization. There seems, however, few articles in the economic theory that is successfully abstract the
idea under the purely mathematical general equilibrium framework. In this paper, by using Sonnenschein's
category theoretical axiomatic characterization of the price mechanism, we show that the price mechanism
is the unique message mechanism that are compatible with the nature of the globalization.
To show our result, we have to generalize the Debreu and Scarf (1963) core equivalence theorem so as to
include the cases in which agents' consumption sets may not have full dimensions in the commodity space.
We overcome this problem by adjusting the feasibility and preference conditions as well as generalizing
the Sonnenschein's axiom S and message dependency on the economic structure. In the above sense,
this paper is a generalization of the model and results of Sonnenschein (1974) to the cases incorporating
partially economy-dependent messages for his response function, and gure out the relationship between
the price mechanism and the expansion possibility of an economy.
In this paper, we identify the extension of an economy in the axiom of Sonnenschein (1974; Axiom
S) with the real expansion of the size of an economy including an expansion of consumption set for each
consumer. We can interpret such situation, especially, the dependency of agents' responses for messages on
the totality or size of an economy, as the cultural globalization. In other words, the opportunity for trades
of participants in an economy is generally expanded if there is a possibility for a society to commodify or
commoditize something that was not previously considered as a commodity.
To allow for the possibility that the function of messages is partially dependent on the economy as well
as on the individual characteristics, is quite natural in treating such a cultural problem together with
the expansion of the economy. Moreover by doing so, we can discuss both the planned and decentralized
economic systems in the universal class or domain of message spaces to characterize the market price
mechanism.
Our conclusion is as follows. Assume that the messages are restricted to those dening core allocations
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and having the property descrived like the axiom of Sonnenschein together with some minor natural
conditions for a universal class of economy dependent message spaces.1 Then, the only mechanism that
satises these conditions is the market price mechanism.
2 The Model
In this paper, we use I; I 0;    etc. as nite index sets of agents. Note that such an index will be used
independently with the notations for economies like E; E0;   , so we sometimes use I as a set of agents in
both E and E0. Let I be the set of agents in economy E. Economy E consists of the feasible consumption
set, the preference preordering and the initial endowment for i 2 I, denoted respectively by XEi , -Ei and
!Ei . For each i 2 I, we dene XEi as a subset of R` such that there exists a nite set of coordinates,
Ki  f1; 2;    ; `g satisfying xi 2 XEi only if t-th coordinate of xi is 0 for all t =2 Ki. The preference
preordering of i in economy E, -Ei , is a subset of XEi XEi and the initial endowment of i in E, !Ei , is
an element of R`+ such that PrRKi !
E
i 2 RKi++.2
We can write an economy, E, as E = (I;-E ; !E), where -E and !E are identied with functions on I,
i.e., for each i 2 I, -E(i) = -Ei and !E(i) = !Ei . In this paper, we suppose that the preference, -Ei , is
represented by a utility function of each individual, uEi : X
E
i ! R, and each uEi satises continuity, strict
monotonicity and strict quasi-concavity (strict convexity in the sense of Debreu 1959).3 Moreover, we
request each economy to satisfy the next resource relatedness or irreducibility condition.
(Irreducibility): In an economy, for each agent i and j, there exists a chain of agents, i0 =
i; i1;    ; im = j, such that Kit \ Kit+1 6= ; for all t = 0; 1;    ;m   1 (see Clark 1979; Lemma2,
Irreducibility).
For each E = (I;-E ; !E), sequence (xi 2 XEi )i2I is called an allocation for E. Allocation (xi 2 XEi )i2I
is said to be feasible if X
i2I
xi5
X
i2I
!i; (1)
where the ordering 5 on R` is dened as x5 y i for each k = 1; 2;    ; `, k-th coordinate of x is less than
or equal to the k-th coordinate of y. A coalition in economy E = (I; f(%i; !i)gi2I) is a set of agents S  I.
Feasible allocation x is said to be the core allocation if there is no coalition S, and no y = (yi)i2S satises
(a)
P
i2S yi5
P
i2S !i, and (b) yi%xi for all i 2 S and yi  xi for at least one i 2 S. We call the set of
all core allocations the core of economy E and denote it by Core(E). Allocation x is said to be blocked by
coalition S if conditions (a) and (b) hold.
Now, let us dene the concept of expansion of economy E. In our setting, the expansion of an economy
may cause the change of each agent's characteristics and the change will be described by the extension of
the feasible consumption set and initial endowments.
1 Sonnenshcein's axiom, Axiom S, is concerning about the simplicity of messages such that the small part of an economy
cannot have a big inuence on the entire economy.
2 In this paper, we canonically identify RKi with the subset of R` such that fx = (x1;    ; x`) 2 R`jxt = 0 for all t =2 Kig.
The range of the projection, PrRKi , from R
` to RKi and the set R
Ki
++ = f(xj)j2Ki jxj > 0 for all j 2 Ki:g are also identied
with subsets of R`.
3 For each x 2 XEi , and for each v 2 RKi+ n f0g, we assume x+ vi i x. To assure the resource relatedness among agents
in economy E where each agent i 2 I does not necessarily have full-dimensional consumption set, XEi  R`+, we use the
strict monotonicity condition for preferences. The condition can be dropped if we assume a certain kind of insatiability for
the society (see Murakami and Urai 2016).
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We write the set of economies as Econ. In the following, we dene a message mechanism on an economy.
Let A be a set. Given a message, a 2 A, we assume that for each economy E = (I;-E ; !E), allocation
f(a;E) = (f i(a;E))i2I 2
Q
i2I X
E
i is dened. We call f on A  Econ such that (a;E) 7! f(a;E) 2Q
i2I X
E
i a response function. In addition, we consider an equilibrium correspondence  : Econ 3 E 7!
(E)  A. As in Sonnenschein (1974), given a correspondence, g, that denes for each economy E =
(I;-E ; !E) a subset of its feasible allocations, we call the triple (A;; f) as an abstract message mechanism
(a resource allocation mechanism with messages) based on social choice correspondence g, if
g(E) = f(f i(a;E))i2I j a 2 (E)g: (2)
For economies, E = (I;-E ; !E) and E0 = (I 0;-E
0
; !E
0
), we write E ,! E0 to mean that (i) I  I 0, (ii)
for -Ei  XEi XEi and -E
0
i  XI
0
i XI
0
i , we have X
I
i  XI
0
i and -
E
i = X
E
i XEi \-E
0
i for each i 2 I,
and (iii) for each i 2 I, !Ei 5!E
0
i . We simply write E  E0 if E ,! E0 and XEi = XE
0
i for all i 2 I.
Let us consider the following axioms for f and .
(C1) Responses are invariant for the expansion of the economy. (Mechanism is decentral-
ized.) That is, 8a 2 A, 8E 2 Econ, 8E0 2 Econ, E  E0,
f(a;E) is a restriction of f(a;E0) on members of E: (3)
(C2) Equilibrium responses are core compatible. That is, 8a 2 A, E 2 Econ,
a 2 (E) =) f(a;E) 2 g(E)  Core(E): (4)
(C3) Mechanism satises Sonnenschein's Axiom S. That is, for each economy E and each
message a 2 A, there exists an economy E0  E such that a is an equilibrium message for E0.
Dene the set of price vectors, P , as P = f(p1;    ; p`) 2 R`+ j
P`
k=1 pk = 1g. The
price mechanism is an allocation mechanism with messages, (P; ; e), where for each E =
(I;-E ; !E) 2 Econ, (E)  P denotes the set of all competitive equilibrium prices for E and
for each p 2 P , e(p) = (ei(p))i2I 2
Q
i2I X
E
i is the list of the value of each agent's excess
demand function.4
R1 
6
1C  h
C P
CA
e
f
@
@
@I
Figure 1: Commutative Diagram for the Universal Mapping Problem in Sonnenschein (1974)
4 The excess demand function exists since each agent's utility function is strictly quasi-concave.
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The commutative diagram in Figure 1 with respect to the class of agents' characteristics, C,
information sets, excess demand structure and any equilibrium structures satisfying the axioms
(C1), (C2) and (C3) was proved in Sonnenschein (1974) as the next proposition.
PROPOSITION (Sonnenschein 1974; Propositions 1 and 7) : If (A;; f) is a
message mechanism based on a social choice correspondence g, and if (A;; f) satises axioms
(C1), (C2) and (C3), then there exists a unique function h : A ! P such that the triangle in
Figure 1 commutes (Dictionary Property). Moreover, the mechanism that can play the above
dictionary property is unique up to isomorphism (Universal Mapping Property).
3 Examples, Lemma and Theorem
Now, we consider a more general conditions to characterize the price mechanism under the
globalization or the economic expansion framework. In the following, the axioms, (C1), (C2)
and (C3), are reformulated by making allowance for the expansion concept of economies. The
private representation axiom, (C1), will be dissolved and absorbed into our new axiom (C
0
3), an
analogue of Sonnenschein's axiom S incorporating the economy depending response functions
and the meanings of economic expansion as the enlightenment under cultural globalization.
Let us consider the following condition.
(C 03) For each message a 2 A, for each nite list of economies E1; E2;    ; Em and the
list of responses f(E1; a); f(E2; a);    ; f(Em; a), there exists economy E = (I;-E ; !E),
E1 ,! E;    ; Em ,! E, including all members of E1; E2;    ; Em as dierent agents, such
that a is an equilibrium message for E under which the equilibrium list (fi(E; a))i2I is an
extension of f(E1; a); f(E2; a);    ; f(Em; a).
Instead of the conditions (C1) and (C3) in the previous section, we use the condition (C
0
3)
saying that for any message a and for any m-sequence of agents and economies with various
stages of enlightenments, there is a suciently large economy E such that E includes all m-
members and a is an equilibrium message for E. This is a natural extension of Sonnenschein's
axiom S or (C3) and his setting (C1) to our situation including economic expansion and can
be interpreted as the feature of messages such that \any nite individuals can be swamped"
or as \a restriction on messages to be simple in the sense that they do not carry too much
information about the membership of an economy" (see Sonnenschein 1974).
In the previous section, (C1) indicates that the responses of agents do not depend on
the scale of the economy. The above extended axiom (C 03) of (C1) and (C3) generalizes the
private representation (decentralization) settings in Sonnenschein (1974), enabling us to discuss
problems such as cultural globalization under the changes of consumption sets like Xi  X 0i
through an expansion of the economy. We give some examples in the following.
Example 1: (Dietary Culture) Under the expansion of the economy, if a certain com-
modity that were not thought to be edible becomes a commodity for food in the new culture,
we can treat such a situation by an expansion of feasible consumption set Xi of each consumer,
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e.g., sushi and sashimi culture for Western countries, the dietary culture of milk and beef for
Japanese in Meiji era, and so on.
Example 2: (Female labor force) We can handle the situation that the woman labor
force can be utilized for newly possible purposes in the new culture after the expansion of an
economy. By considering the labor as negative consumption good, the extension of a dimension
of the consumption set will appropriately describe the situation.
Example 3: (Immigrants) It can be said that the inow of immigrants is an expansion
of the economy. If the labor force of immigrants is appreciated in the expanded economy more
than the original one, we can describe it as an extension of feasible consumption set. In this
case, we consider many kinds of labor forces of immigrants as negative consumption goods, e.g.,
immigration from the society where the baby-sitting, window cleaning, etc., are not recognized
as a wage labour, emigration to the country where a person with a high IT ability is more
appreciated, and so on.
Example 4: (Free Trade Zone) If we ignore the problem of monopolistic market power
of global multinational corporations, we can interpret the extension of feasible consumption
set like here, as treating the merit of the normal free trade argument under the pure exchange
framework (without considering the production). In this case, we can treat the expansion in
the positive direction of the production set as the expansion in the negative direction of the
consumption set.
Example 5: (Multinational Corporation) Our model does not include the production.
However, if we identify the negative consumption (e.g., the supply of the labor force) as inputs
for a certain production, we can treat the problem such that after the expansion of an economy a
domestic worker has a possibility to be hired by a multinational cooperation in another country.
The situation is also possible to be considered an expansion of his consumption set.
To our result, it is necessary to generalize the Debreu-Scarf (1963) core equivalence theorem
to our framework, so that the consumption sets of agents may not have full dimensions in the
commodity space R`.
LEMMA: (Debreu-Scarf Limit Theorem without Full Dimensional Consump-
tion Sets) In our settings of section 2, for every economy E = (I;-E ; !E) 2 Econ, feasible
allocation x for E is a competitive equilibrium allocation if its N -fold replica allocation belongs
to Core(EN ) for every positive integer N , where EN denotes the N -fold replica economy of E.
PROOF: See Appendix A. 
To show the extension theorem of Sonnenschein (1974; Propositions 1 and 7), it is necessary
to describe the commutative diagram in Figure 1 by considering the dependence of responses
on economy E.
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6
1Econ  h
Econ P
EconA
e
f
@
@
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Figure 2: A Commutative Diagram for Economy Dependent Message Mechanisms
THEOREM: If (A;; f) is a message mechanism based on social choice correspondence
g, and if (A;; f) satises axioms (C2) and (C
0
3), then there exists a unique function h : A! P
such that the triangle in Figure 2 commutes (Dictionary Property). Moreover the mechanism
that can play the above dictionary property is unique up to isomorphism (Universal Mapping
Property).
PROOF: See Appendix B. 
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Appendix A
Proof of LEMMA
This lemma can be proved in the similar way to the proof of Debreu and Scarf (1963;
Theorem 3) except for the continuity argument for suciently large k concerning the formation
of the blocking coalition (in our proof, see the limit argument around equation (5) using
projection on RKi+ and the weak feasibility condition) and positive price argument based on
the minimum wealth condition (in our proof, see the paragraph that contains footnote 6). For
the sake of completeness, we shall give a simple sketch of the total proof.
Let x = (xi)i2I be a feasible allocation for economy E = (I;-E ; !E) such that every N -
fold replica allocation of x belongs to Core(EN ) for all N = 1. Dene for each i 2 I,  i as
 i = fzi j zi + !Ei i xig  RKi where Ki denotes the set of commodities such that xi 2 XEi
i t-th coordinate of xi is 0 for all t =2 Ki. Then, take the convex hull   of nite unionS
i2I  i  R`. Since  i is convex and non-empty for every i,   becomes a non-empty convex
set.
We will show 0 =2  . Let us suppose the contrary. Then, one can writePi2I izi = 0, with
i= 0 and
P
i2I i = 1, zi + !
E
i i xi for each i 2 I. For suciently large k, let aki be the
smallest integer greater than ki. Also, let J be the set of all i 2 I for which i > 0. For each
i 2 J , we dene zki as kiaki zi. Observe that z
k
i + !
E
i belongs to the segment [!
E
i ; zi + !
E
i ].
For i 2 J , zki +!Ei tends to zi+!Ei as k tends to innity. Hence, we have PrRKi (zki +!Ei ) also
tends to zi+!
E
i 2 RKi , where the range of projection PrRKi , RKi , is canonically identied with
the subset of R`. The continuity assumption on preferences implies that PrRKi (z
k
i +!
E
i ) i xi
for all i 2 J , for all k suciently large. Select one of such k. Then we haveX
i2J
aki z
k
i = k
X
i2J
izi = 0: (5)
Let us consider the replica economy EN with N = maxi2J aki . Take the coalition, S,
composed of aki replica members of i for each i 2 J to each one of whom we assign zki + !Ei .
This coalition blocks the allocation (xi) by equation (5) and the fact that PrRKi (z
k
i +!
E
i ) i xi
for each i 2 J , since Pi2S(PrRKi (zki + !Ei ))5Pi2S(zki + !Ei ) under the non negativity of
zki (t) + !
E
i (t) 2 [0 = zi(t) + !Ei (t); !Ei (t)] for each t =2 Ki. This is a contradiction to the
denition of Core(EN ) and our denition of the feasibility under 5. Hence, we have established
0 =2  .
Let K =
S
i2I Ki and  be the set of prices such that  = fp 2 RK \ j p z= 0 for all z 2
 g, where  represents the standard (]K   1)-dimensional simplex of RK , i.e.,  = fp j p =
(p1; p2;    ; pK) 2 RK+ ;
PK
k=1 pk = 1g. Set  is closed in RK+ and is non-empty since there
7
exists p 2 RK n f0g by the separating hyperplane theorem.5
From p 2  and !i 2 RKi++ together with the irreducibility condition, it is a routine task
to show that p  !i > 0 for all i 2 I. Then, if a price of some commodity k 2 K, pk, is zero,
we have a contradiction as follows. From the strict monotonicity condition for preferences and
the irreducibility, there exist some agent who demands the commodity k at x. We call one
such agent as i. Consider rst the case that p  xi = 0. Then, since p  !i > 0, let  2 R++ be
suciently small value such that p  !i > pk. A vector xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0)   !i such
that xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0) is strictly preferred to xi, where + > 0 is the k-th coordinate
of a commodity, will not be non-negatively supported by p. This is a contradiction to the
denition of  . Secondly, if p  xi > 0, we have pk = 0 and there exist a commodity k0 6= k such
that pk0 > 0 and xik0 > 0. Then, a vector xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0; ; 0;    ; 0) such that
xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0; ; 0;    ; 0) is strictly preferred to xi,6 where + > 0 is the k-th
coordinate of a commodity and   < 0 is the k0-th coordinate of a commodity, will not be
non-negatively supported by p. This is a contradiction to the denition of  . Hence, p 2 RK++
holds for each p 2 . Let us choose one of such p arbitrarily and denote it by p.
For each i 2 I, since xi i xi means that xi   !i belongs to  i, we have p  xi= p  !i.
Moreover, for each i 2 I, since p is non-negative and the strict monotonicity holds on this
point xi, we can take xi arbitrarily near to xi. Then we have p
  xi= p  !i. Feasibility,P
i2I xi5
P
i2I !i, means that xi satises the budget constraint and is an individual maxima
under price p. Hence, allocation x is a competitive equilibrium allocation. 
Appendix B
Proof of THEOREM
The rst assertion: Dictionary Property
Let a 2 A be a message and E1 = (I1;-E1 ; !E1) 2 Econ be an arbitrary economy. Under
(C 03), there exists E
 = (I;-E

; !E

) such that E1 ,! E and a 2 (E). Without loss of
generality, we can assume that there is at least one individual in E who has Cobb-Douglas
utility function. Since by (C2), f(a;E
) 2 Core(E), we can take pa;E1;E for supporting price
vector on both f(a;E) and f(a;E1), which is unique due to the existence of a Cobb-Douglas
utility agent in E.
Next, we show that under pa;E1;E , fi(a;E
) satises the budget constraint for all i 2 I.
Assume not. Then, the allocation f(a;E) is not a Walras allocation. By our limit lemma, there
exist a positive n such that the n-fold replica allocation of f(a;E) cannot be in the core of the
n-fold replica economy of E, (E)n. Hence, we have a set G of the individuals in (E)n who
can block the n-fold replica allocation of f(a;E). By applying (C 03) for (E
)n, by identifying
it with E ,! E ,!    ,! E, there exists E such that a 2 (E) and E ,! E.Moreover
by (C2), f(a;E
) is an element of Core(E) satisfying that fi(a;E) = fi(a;E) for all i of
5 For example, consider any element z 2  . For element z 2  , in the non-negative direction of every coordinate, there
exist !i+zi+e
k that is preferred to !i+zi by some agent, and there also exists z+e
k 2   from the monotonicity condition.
Note that ek is a unit vector ek = (0;    ; 0; 1; 0;    ; 0) of RK where the k-th coordinate is 1. Hence, from the convexity of  ,
  has interior points. Concerning the separating hyperplane theorem, see, for example, Schaefer (1971; p.46, Theorem 3.1).
6 From the monotonicity and irreducibility conditions, we have (xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0)) i xi for each + > 0. Then,
from the continuity of preferences, we also have xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0; ; 0;    ; 0) i xi for suciently small  > 0.
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(E)n. But this is impossible because G blocks the utility allocation under f(a;E). Therefore
pa;E1;E  (fi(a;E)  !i ) = 0 for all i 2 I.
Finally we check that the choice of pa;E1;E does not depend on E
1 and E. Let us dene
E10 and E0 as E10 ,! E0 and a 2 (E0), and take the supporting price pa;E10;E0 in exactly
the same way with the previous paragraph. Let us consider an economy E2 that consists
of all members of E and E0. By applying (C 03) on E
 ,! E2, we obtain E1 such that
E ,! E2 ,! E1 and a 2 (E1). Note that f(a;E1) is an extension of f(a;E) and is a
core allocation. Therefore the unique supporting price pa;E1;E on f(a;E
) and the supporting
price on f(a;E1) are equal. Moreover, by applying (C 03) again on E
0 ,! E2 ,! E1, we
obtain E2 such that E0 ,! E2 ,! E1 ,! E2 and a 2 (E2). Note that f(a;E2)
is an extension of f(a;E0) and f(a;E1), and is a core allocation. Therefore, under the
existence of Cobb-Douglas utility agent in both E and E0, the unique supporting price on
allocation f(a;E2), pa;E10;E0 , and pa;E1;E are equal.
The second assertion: Universal Mapping Property
This property is a direct result of fundamental mathematical theorem on the universal
mapping. See, e.g., Bourbaki(1966). 
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